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Abstract 10 
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) provides corrections for satellite navigation signals together 11 
with integrity parameters to aircraft and enables precision approach guidance. It will eventually replace the 12 
currently used Instrument Landing System (ILS). GBAS Approach Service Type (GAST) C stations supporting 13 
CAT-I operations have been fully developed and certified and first stations are operational. For the service type 14 
D, which is intended to support CAT-III operations including automatic approaches and landings, requirements 15 
have been drafted and are currently undergoing validation. One remaining issue is the requirement for 16 
monitoring of ionospheric anomalies in the ground subsystem. Large gradients in the concentration of free 17 
electrons in the ionosphere can lead to significant positioning errors when navigation is based on differential 18 
methods. We give a review of the derivation of currently proposed performance requirements for such a monitor. 19 
Next, we show that the required level of safety from an airworthiness perspective can be achieved even with 20 
relaxed monitoring requirements compared to the currently drafted standards. These relaxations result from 21 
satellite geometry assessments on the ground and actual approach characteristics towards a runway. We show 22 
that with this method it is sufficient to monitor for gradients in the range of about 450-550 mm/km while current 23 
standards require detection already from 300 mm/km. A remote monitoring receiver near the touchdown point 24 
can monitor the post-correction differential range error and use it as test statistic for GBAS performance 25 
monitoring and protection against ionospheric disturbances.  26 
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Introduction and background 30 
In March 2012 the first GBAS Approach Service Type C (GAST C) ground station achieved full certification. 31 
This service type supports operations equivalent to a CAT-I ILS with a minimum decision height of 200 ft and a 32 
runway visual range of at least 550 m. It is located in Bremen (ICAO identifier EDDW) in northern Germany 33 
and since then is regularly used by Air Berlin which has equipped a large portion of their B737-NG fleet with the 34 
GBAS Landing System (GLS). GBAS stations in Newark and Houston have become operational as well and are 35 
used by United Airlines with their B787 fleet and part of their B737-NG fleet. Other airports like Zurich and 36 
Frankfurt are currently installing systems. A number of trial GBAS stations with different levels of progress 37 
towards certification have been set up in several countries including Spain, France, Australia, Germany and 38 
Russia. After having reached this important milestone of GAST C certification for ground stations, current 39 
research and development effort is focusing on meeting all necessary requirements to support operations also 40 
under CAT-II/III weather conditions. The set of airborne and ground requirements for these operations based on 41 
single frequency GPS navigation is summarized as GAST D. With the main concern being decorrelation of 42 
ionospheric effects between the ground station and a user, most of the additional monitoring built into the GAST 43 
D architecture is dedicated to detection and mitigation of this threat (Murphy 2006). A potentially hazardous 44 
situation is shown in Figure 1 which illustrates a worst case ionospheric front situation.  45 
 46 
Fig. 1 Illustration of a potentially hazardous situation caused by an ionospheric front 47 
 48 
In the Contiguous United States (CONUS) the currently valid threat model assumes a largest value for the spatial 49 
decorrelation of 425 mm/km in pseudoranges while the German threat model only considers 140 mm/km based 50 
on measurements over one solar cycle (Pullen 2009; Mayer 2009). Despite the fact that those threat models have 51 
been established, long-term monitoring is still on-going to validate these values (Jung 2012).  52 
A GBAS ground station is required to protect users from potentially dangerous ionospheric situations. 53 
Gradients up to 300 mm/km are accounted for in the protection level risk together with a siting limit which 54 
restricts the largest distance between the GBAS reference point and a runway threshold to 5 km. Larger gradients 55 
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have to be identified by an ionospheric gradient monitor. There have been two proposals how to address this 56 
task. The first one uses double-differenced carrier phase measurements (Khanafseh 2012). This method, 57 
however, requires a pre-defined prior probability of occurrence of an ionospheric anomaly and antenna phase 58 
center stability in the order of millimeters. The 5 km siting limit is necessary with this architecture to protect 59 
users from the effect of worst case gradients. The second method is a carrier phase based, code aided technique 60 
(Fujita 2010). It is based on resolving carrier phase ambiguities, but correct fixing of the integer ambiguity with 61 
the required level of integrity is still a challenge.  62 
In the next section we propose a different approach to this task by reviewing the origin of the currently 63 
proposed requirements and suggesting possible relaxations at certain steps where unnecessarily conservative 64 
assumptions are made. At all times the safety targets are maintained but instead of taking worst case 65 
assumptions, the actual approach geometry as well as the current satellite geometry are considered. In the 66 
following two sections we present a scheme for ground monitoring which applies these relaxations and is 67 
designed to fulfill the ionosphere monitoring task. Finally, an investigation of the monitor performance is carried 68 
out for various potential GBAS locations showing that the proposed architecture can protect users at the required 69 
level of integrity.  70 
Derivation of Ground Monitoring Requirements 71 
After initial attempts to derive requirements for GBAS from the performance of current ILS, the adopted strategy 72 
is to derive requirements from an airworthiness point of view (Schuster 2010). A schematic overview is given in 73 
Figure 2.  74 
 75 
 76 
Fig. 2 Derivation of range-domain requirements from airworthiness considerations 77 
 78 
A limit on the largest vertical positioning error is determined from the touch-down requirements. It is sufficient 79 
to consider only the vertical requirements since they are more difficult to fulfill than the lateral ones. This is 80 
done making assumptions about the performance of autopilot systems and the glide path angle of the approach. 81 
The proposed monitor would not be operating in the position domain, but rather in the range domain and thus 82 
depend on the actual current satellite geometry. We now discuss the way how the thresholds are derived and 83 
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propose changes to the assumptions where appropriate, in order to relax the requirements without compromising 84 
safety. The derivation and assumptions follow the steps described by Burns (2009).  85 
The drafted and frozen standards and recommended practices (SARPs) (ICAO 2010) result from the 86 
definition of a safe landing, as given in European certification specifications for all-weather operations CS-AWO 87 
131 (EASA 2003)  and similarly in AC 120-28D (FAA 1999). The most relevant part for GBAS relates to the 88 
requirement that the aircraft lands inside the so-called touchdown box with a sensible attitude and sink rate. It is 89 
an area on the runway where the main landing gear of the aircraft has to touch down. The longitudinal 90 
dimensions and tolerable probabilities of not meeting the requirement are summarized in Table 1 and depicted in 91 
Figure 3. All distances are given in direction of flight behind the runway threshold. The lateral limit is 5 ft (1.5 92 
m) from the edge of the runway for the outer main landing gear. 93 
Table 1 Touchdown requirements according to EASA (2003) and FAA (1999) 94 
 95 
Case Land short limit (ft) Land long limit (ft) Allowable probability of 
exceeding the limit 
Nominal 200 2700 10-6 
Limit 200 3000 10-5 
Malfunction 200 3000 0 
 96 
Fig. 3 Longitudinal touchdown requirements (EASA 2003, FAA 1999) 97 
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 99 
CS-AWO distinguishes three different cases for which the aircraft has to land in the touchdown box: the nominal 100 
case, the limit case, and the malfunction case. In the nominal case all influencing parameters vary according to 101 
their nominal distributions. In the limit case one parameter is kept at its most critical value while all other 102 
parameters vary according to their nominal distributions. In the malfunction case, one parameter exceeds its 103 
threshold value without detection or mitigation within the system. An undetected ionospheric gradient resulting 104 
in large positioning errors can be treated as a malfunction. Further discussion is thus limited to this case. In the 105 
malfunction case the aircraft has to land in the touchdown box with complete certainty for any effect occurring 106 
and not being detected with a higher probability than 10-9.  107 
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This requirement limits the Total System Error (TSE) of the aircraft. It is assumed that a vertical 108 
position error vE on the approach would translate to an along-track touchdown error atrkE  which is the relevant 109 
parameter in terms of the requirements mentioned. The relation is described based on the glide path angle 110 
( )GPA of the approach as: 111 
  tan( )v atrkE E GPA    (0) 112 
This description originates from the autopilot logic which switches vertical guidance from ILS or GLS to the 113 
radar altimeter at a defined radar altitude, typically between 30 and 100 ft depending on the aircraft. Glide path 114 
angles of precision approaches can be in the range of 2.5° to 3.5°. For a conservative assessment of the 115 
maximum allowable vertical error, a GPA of 2.5° is assumed. This is usually unnecessarily conservative, since 116 
most approaches have a 3° or even higher GPA. In any case, it is a known parameter which is transmitted in the 117 
type 4 GBAS message (RTCA 2008a) and can be used for the derivation of a monitoring requirement for each 118 
individual GBAS approach.  119 
The largest allowable error in along-track direction is given by the land short and long limits 120 
summarized in Table 1 and the assumption that the nominal touchdown point (NTDP) is located at a distance of 121 
1290 ft (393.2 m) behind the runway threshold. The TSE budget, however, has to be split between the 122 
Navigation System Error (NSE) and the Flight Technical Error (FTE). The assumption used in the derivation of 123 
requirements is that they are statistically independent with a standard deviation of the along-track touchdown 124 
dispersion due to the flight technical error of 180 ft (54.9 m)FTE  . A study about the touchdown performance 125 
was conducted by Boeing (2005) and this value is expected to apply to all aircraft types which are likely to be 126 
equipped with GLS. The NSE budget must contain the nominal GBAS noise plus an undetected vertical error 127 
,v ionoE  due to the ionosphere. The standard deviation of the fault-free vertical NSE , ,NSE vert ff  for GBAS is 128 
limited by the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) and the associated integrity risk of 10-7 such that 129 
 , , / 10m / 5.81 1.72mNSE vert ff ffmdVAL K     (0) 130 
The Kffmd is based on three reference receivers according to Table 2-16 in DO-253C. Since the nominal NSE and 131 
FTE are usually described as Gaussian distributed random variables, complete certainty cannot be achieved 132 
unless the stochastic nature is not considered. To show compliance with the requirement, fixed, non-variable 133 
values for the FTE and NSE are used. What is done in the requirement derivation and shown to be sufficient by 134 
Clark (2006) in this context is taking NSE and FTE at their 95th percentiles corresponding to 1.96 times their 135 
standard deviation for the fault-free case (indicated as subscript ff,95%). With the condition that the aircraft has 136 
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to land not less than 200 ft (61.0 m) behind the runway threshold, the condition for the land-short case can be 137 
formulated as 138 
 , ,95% , ,95%61m NTDP FTEtan( )
vert ff v iono
ff
NSE E
GPA
    (0) 139 
With all the above described values solving (3) for ,v ionoE  yields a maximum tolerable value of 140 
, ,max 6.44 mv ionoE  . However, changing the GPA to a value of 3° results in , ,max 8.40 mv ionoE  .  141 
Now this limit in the position domain has to be transformed into a limit in the range domain. The 142 
relation between the two domains is given by the projection matrix S which is defined as  143 
  1( )T TS G W G G W       (0) 144 
The geometry matrix G  contains the normalized line-of-sight vectors from each of the N satellites to the user 145 
and a “1” in the fourth column for the receiver clock offset. The weighting matrix W , as defined in DO-253C 146 
(RTCA 2008b), is a diagonal matrix containing the inverse of the expected fault-free variance of the 147 
pseudorange measurement associated with each satellite as non-zero elements. These variances 2i  are given as 148 
 2 2 2 2 2, , , , , ,i pr gnd i pr air i tropo i iono i         (0) 149 
where ,pr gnd describes the standard deviation of the ground station contribution, ,pr air the airborne contribution 150 
due to noise and airframe multipath, tropo the residual tropospheric uncertainty and iono the residual ionospheric 151 
uncertainty (McGraw 2000, RTCA 2008b). The residual ionospheric and tropospheric uncertainties depend on 152 
the horizontal and vertical distance between the GBAS station and the user, while the other two parameters 153 
depend on the quality classification of the ground station and airborne receiver and the smoothing time. Thus, for 154 
calculation of the individual error contributions assumptions have to be made. In this study the Ground Accuracy 155 
Designator (GAD) and Airborne Accuracy Designator (AAD) were chosen as “C” and “B”, respectively, in 156 
order to represent the expected equipment classification for GAST-D operations. For the ionospheric uncertainty 157 
a distance to the GBAS reference point of 6 km was assumed due to the 5 km siting limit between the reference 158 
point and the threshold plus 1 km for the distance between the aircraft at 200 ft and the threshold. The position 159 
estimation is accomplished by a linearization around an initial position estimate and then a standard iterative 160 
least-squares solution which can be described as 161 
 x S y     (0) 162 
where x is the 4-dimensional position and receiver clock increment for an initial position and y the N-163 
dimensional vector containing difference between the corrected and smoothed pseudoranges and the expected 164 
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ranges based on the position estimate. The contribution of one satellite i to the position estimate vertical to the 165 
approach track is given by  166 
 
, 3, 1, tan( )vert i i iS s s GPA    (0) 167 
where ,vert iS  is a scalar parameter describing the weight which is given to the measurement of satellite i , s are 168 
the elements of S from (6) and the coordinates are given in an approach coordinate system moving with the 169 
aircraft along the approach track. In the airborne geometry screening process in GAST-D the 
,vert iS are assumed 170 
to be limited to a maximum of 4 (Harris 2007), i.e. the contribution of a single satellite to a vertical position error 171 
with respect to the approach track cannot be larger than 4 times the corresponding post correction range error. 172 
Hence, according to the draft SARPs a single pseudorange error may not be larger than 173 
 , ,max, ,max
, ,max
6.4m
1.6m
4
v iono
r i
vert i
E
E
S
    (0) 174 
The values assumed in (8) are, however, usually unnecessary conservative. Apart from the 
, ,maxv ionoE , as 175 
described before, the other conservative assumption is the value of 4 for the 
, ,maxvert iS . The ground station is 176 
generally unaware of the satellite subset used by the aircraft, and thus the S-factors an airborne receiver may 177 
apply. Hence, the most conservative value which can be associated with each satellite has to be used for 178 
monitoring purposes. However, depending on the set of satellites, for which GBAS corrections are provided, the 179 
, ,maxvert iS  is limited to values generally smaller than 4. In order to be conservative a monitoring receiver must 180 
determine all possible and valid subsets of satellites for which corrections are provided. Together with 181 
conservative assumptions about distance, speed and the aircraft’s AAD, a worst case 
,vert iS for each satellite can 182 
be calculated as maximum over all valid satellite subsets. A subset of satellites is valid if it contains at least four 183 
satellites, the 4vertS  limit is fulfilled for each of those satellites and at the same time the Vertical Protection 184 
Level (VPL) is smaller than the VAL. From this information the largest projection factor can be calculated for 185 
each satellite. This will be done considering the current, given geometry. Only the case of a single affected 186 
satellite is considered since a large gradient affecting more than one satellite is considered to be sufficiently 187 
unlikely. Due to the fact that the speeds of the ionospheric pierce points of different satellites are practically 188 
always different, such a gradient would not appear stationary on different pseudorange measurements (Lee 2011) 189 
and could thus be detected by other monitors like the CCD or DSIGMA (Simili 2006, Murphy 2006). By 190 
increasing the numerator of (8) and decreasing the denominator at the same time as proposed in this section, the 191 
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actual 
, ,maxr iE for each satellite will almost always be larger than 1.6 m and thus relax the currently proposed 192 
requirements (ICAO 2010).  193 
Differential Range Error Monitor 194 
A method for ensuring this post correction range error limit in general, and mitigating the ionospheric threat in 195 
particular, can be based on positioning an additional GNSS receiver at a surveyed location close to the 196 
touchdown point of the runway to which approach service is provided. This monitor plays the role of a pseudo 197 
user, i.e. it receives and applies GBAS corrections received from the GBAS ground station to correct its own 198 
GNSS measurements. The basic idea behind this kind of monitoring is that if an error source, such as an 199 
ionospheric disturbance, affects an arriving aircraft in a potentially dangerous way, then the monitor would be 200 
affected in a similar way. This is justified since spatial decorrelation between the user and the monitor is 201 
minimal, data processing of the raw measurements is the same and the effect does not depend on receiver 202 
implementation and airframe characteristics. The smoothed and corrected pseudorange 
,smt corrP  for each satellite 203 
can be described as sum of the theoretical range r , an undesired residual range error rangeE , the user clock bias 204 
userc t  and a noise term  as 205 
 ,smt corr range userP r E c t        (0) 206 
The theoretical range term can be calculated by precise knowledge of the monitor receiver location and is thus a 207 
known parameter. The user clock term is common to all pseudorange measurements. It can therefore be removed 208 
from the measurements in the same way as it is done in the calculation of the pseudorange corrections in the 209 
ground systems. This process is called “smoothed clock adjust” and is described in chapter 3.7.1.2.8.3.5 of ED-210 
114A (Eurocae 2013). After removing the geometrical range portion of 
,smt corrP for all satellites in view, the 211 
average residual range over all satellites is treated as receiver clock bias. While this is usually not exactly true, it 212 
does not influence the performance of the monitor since a range bias which is common to all pseudoranges is 213 
mapped into the user clock offset. The remaining parts are the sum of the residual range error and noise. These 214 
two cannot be separated and their sum shall be called testE , which can be described as 215 
 , ,
1
1 N
test smt corr r i
i
E P r E
N 
     (0) 216 
 with N  the number of satellites used. This quantity will be the monitored parameter.  217 
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 218 
Monitor design 219 
In a next step the threshold value for the monitored parameter, i.e. the largest value for which testE is still 220 
considered nominal, has to be derived. This limit has to fulfill the condition that a possible threat is detected with 221 
the required probability of missed detection, and at the same time have a sufficiently low probability of false 222 
alarm. The trade-off is shown in the following plot.  223 
 224 
Fig. 4 Example trade-off between probability of missed detection (red shaded) and probability of false 225 
alarm (blue dotted). The dashed blue curve shows the expected range error pdf while the red curve shows 226 
the expected noise and multipath of the monitoring receiver centered at the minimum detectable error 227 
(MDE) 228 
 229 
The properties of this monitor depend on four parameters: 230 
 The actual expected distribution of the post-corrected range errors is illustrated by the dashed blue 231 
curve in the plot above. In the case of the monitor under discussion it is represented by a non-biased 232 
Gaussian distribution for each pseudorange measurement with standard deviation i  and was 233 
described in (5). This model depends on geometry, satellite elevation, altitude difference and distance 234 
between the airborne receiver and the GBAS reference point, as well as speed of the aircraft and 235 
equipment classification. The parameters used in determining the uncertainty should correspond to the 236 
expected error distribution of the signal, i.e. for GAST D using _ _ 30pr gnd from the Type 11 GBAS 237 
message (RTCA, 2008a) and a time constant 30  seconds to represent the residual noise from the 238 
ground system and the appropriate contribution to the ionospheric uncertainty in (5).  239 
 The next influencing parameter is the minimum detectable error (MDE) of the monitor where the red 240 
curve of the monitor noise probability density function (pdf) is centered. The MDE in this monitoring 241 
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scheme corresponds to 
, ,maxr iE from (8) for each satellite. As shown earlier, it depends on airworthiness 242 
considerations and is the largest tolerable range error which is attributed to one satellite, such that the 243 
aircraft can still operate safely.  244 
 Next, the probability of missed detection which is attributed to the monitor has an impact on the overall 245 
performance. It is shown as the red shaded area in Figure 4. Since in airworthiness considerations the 246 
requirement for the fault case is specified for each error with a probability of occurrence greater than 247 
10-9, the product of a probability of occurrence and probability of not detecting such a disturbance has 248 
to be smaller than 10-9.  249 
 Finally, the noise and multipath characteristics of the monitoring receiver have a significant impact on 250 
the overall performance of the monitor. The lower the noise and multipath characteristics, the larger the 251 
monitoring threshold becomes. According to several studies which were performed for evaluation of the 252 
GBAS error models, the main concern for ground based receivers is multipath from ground reflections. 253 
Hence, strict siting criteria for GBAS reference antennas were developed and multipath limiting 254 
antennas are used (FAA 2010).  255 
 256 
The expected error distribution is defined in (5). For the derivation of the MDE from (8) we propose to use the 257 
actual GPA transmitted in the GBAS message which is typically 3°. When taking a Gaussian noise model for the 258 
monitor performance, the detection threshold monthrE  with the respective mdp requirement and the standard 259 
deviation of the monitor noise monitor can be written as  260 
 monthr md monitorE MDE k     (0) 261 
with  262 
 1 1(0.5 ) 2 ( 1)md md mdk p erf p
        (0) 263 
and ( )x the standard normal distribution. According to (12) the corresponding missed detection multiplier for  264 
910mdp
 is 6.1mdk  . The monitoring condition thus becomes 265 
 , ,max ,
,
6.1v ionomonthr monitor i
vert i
E
E
S
    (0) 266 
for each satellite i . When allowing some credit to be taken for the fact that those events are very rare, a prior 267 
probability ionop can be defined such that instead of  requiring a missed detection probability
910mdp
 , only the 268 
product of prior probability for an ionospheric event and the probability of missed detection has to meet the 269 
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requirement 910md ionop p
  . If a meaningful prior probability can be established, e.g. by external monitoring of 270 
the state of the ionosphere, we propose to use it in order to achieve better false alarm properties.  271 
For the derivation of the monitoring threshold we propose that the projection factors ,vert iS  in (13) 272 
should be calculated for each satellite individually as described in the previous section. The resulting largest 273 
,vert iS at each epoch will always be smaller or equal to 4 which leads to relaxed monitoring requirements since 274 
monthrE increases with decreasing ,vert iS . 275 
For monitor we suggest to use a model which conforms to the GAD C requirement intended for GAST-D 276 
operations. We use the same model as used in (RTCA 2008b) which describes the noise as 277 
 /15.8min(0.24m,  0.15m 0.84m )noise e
      (0) 278 
It is represented by an elevation dependent function which remains constant for satellite elevation angles below 279 
35° to reflect the characteristics of multipath limiting antennas (MLAs) and the siting criteria for GBAS. 280 
Although the noise restrictions required for this kind of monitoring are the most stringent ones in terms of GBAS 281 
Ground Facility Classification, meeting this requirement has been shown to be possible by Dautermann (2012) 282 
with choke-ring antennas and standard receivers in a non-optimal environment which does not meet the GBAS 283 
siting criteria.  284 
Monitor performance 285 
In this section an analysis of the different parameters influencing the monitor performance is carried out. Figure 286 
5 shows the minimum gradient which will be detected by this monitor. It is a function of the MDE of the monitor 287 
and the distance monitord between the GBAS reference point and the location of the monitoring receiver. The 288 
minimum slope ming  of a gradient which has to be detected can then be written as  289 
 , ,maxmin
,
1v iono
monitor vert i monitor
EMDE
g
d S d
    (0) 290 
with the same notation as in the previous equations. The ,vert iS  are calculated according to (7), based on a 291 
standard GBAS weighting and assuming an aircraft speed of 70 m/s, which is a typical approach speed. Out of 292 
all satellites in view the ,vert iS  for the most limiting satellite, i.e. the satellite with the largest expected test 293 
statistic, is taken for a GBAS located at Braunschweig/Wolfsburg airport in northern Germany. The monitor 294 
receiver is assumed to be located 5 km from the GBAS reference point in runway direction towards the east. 295 
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Two different values for the GPA are plotted to show the possible relaxations of the monitoring requirement in 296 
comparison to the current 300 mm/km limit. The larger GPA relaxes the constraint on the largest tolerable 297 
vertical error as described in (1) and thus enlarges the tolerable slope of an ionospheric gradient. 298 
 299 
Fig. 5 Minimum size of gradients which will be detected by a monitor located 5km away from the GBAS 300 
reference point. The dashed blue curve shows the values for a 2.5° GPA while the red curve shows the 301 
required detection for a standard 3° GPA. The black line shows the currently required value 302 
 303 
The minimum slope of a gradient which needs to be detected considering a 2.5° GPA increases to values 304 
typically varying between 350 and 450 mm/km over a day, while at a 3° GPA only gradients as large as 450 to 305 
550 mm/km are serious enough to create a potentially dangerous vertical error. At all times the monitoring 306 
thresholds are significantly larger than the currently required 300 mm/km.  307 
Figure 6 shows the corresponding monitoring threshold over one day which was described in (13) with 308 
a missed detection probability 910mdp
 . For comparison two curves are plotted showing again the different 309 
monitoring thresholds for a 2.5° or 3.0° GPA. The monitor threshold over the day typically varies between 0.5 m 310 
and 1 m for the 2.5° GPA and between 1 m and 1.6 m for the 3° GPA. The peak shortly before 14 h represents a 311 
situation where for a short time the largest possible vertS is as small as 2.57 and the corresponding monitor 312 
threshold increases to almost 2 m.  313 
 13 
 
 314 
Fig. 6 Monitor thresholds for Braunschweig airport over one day depending on the glide path angle of the 315 
approach for the most limiting satellite in view  316 
 317 
It can be seen that the higher glide path angle increases the monitor threshold by a factor of roughly 1.6 and thus 318 
reduces the false alarm probability of the system accordingly. It is therefore very beneficial to consider the actual 319 
GPA for an airport, rather than a general worst approach angle for precision approaches. The false alarm 320 
probability is another important parameter since the rate of false alarms impacts the availability and continuity of 321 
the system. It is represented as the dotted blue surface in Figure 4 and can be modeled as 322 
 2 monthrfa
i
E
p 
      (0) 323 
with the standard normal distribution , the monitoring threshold monthrE from (13) and the expected standard 324 
deviation of the smoothed, corrected pseudorange i from (5) for the most critical satellite i . Note that Figure 4 325 
only shows the one-sided probability. The factor 2 in (16) takes into account the fact that the errors can be 326 
positive or negative. Figure 7 shows the false alarm probability over a day corresponding to the monitoring 327 
thresholds from Figure 6 for a 3° GPA.  328 
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 329 
Fig. 7 Probability of false alarm depending on prior probability Piono of occurrence of an ionospheric 330 
disturbance. Both results assume a 3° GPA for the approach 331 
 332 
The dashed blue curve shows the case if no prior probability for the occurrence of an ionospheric disturbance is 333 
defined. In this case the false alarm probability mostly stays in the range of 10-2 to 10-5. For an operational 334 
system these values are large, despite the fact that flagging one satellite would not necessarily limit the 335 
availability of the whole GBAS, since usually there are between 6 and 12 satellites available for navigation. 336 
However, if some credit is taken for the fact that these storms happen very rarely, performance of this monitor 337 
improves significantly. Previous work on this issue, such as (Khanafseh 2012) or (Belabbas 2012) used a value 338 
of 10-5 for the assumed probability of occurrence. This limits the required probability of missed detection to just 339 
10-4 and reduces the k-factor in (11) from 6.1 to 3.7 and thus relaxes the monitoring problem. The results for the 340 
false alarm probability assuming this prior probability for an ionospheric disturbance is shown in red in Figure 7. 341 
It decreases down to values in the range of 10-4 to 10-6. However, a standardized way of determining such a 342 
probability has not yet been developed and needs to be investigated. Due to the more frequent observation of 343 
ionospheric storms, scintillations and plasma bubbles in the high and low latitudes as opposed to the mid-344 
latitudes, such a probability should be defined locally together with the ionospheric threat model or determined 345 
by external information, such as ionospheric parameters from a space based augmentation system (SBAS).  346 
The results shown above are an example for performance at a certain location. However, the monitoring 347 
thresholds and the associated false alarm probabilities do not change substantially in different locations around 348 
the earth and at different latitudes. This is a result of the selection of the worst possible geometry at any location 349 
for the derivation of a conservative monitor threshold. Figure 8 shows the simulated thresholds over one day for 350 
three selected airports in different regions.  351 
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 352 
Fig. 8 Monitor thresholds for the most limiting satellite in view over one day at different latitudes. Anchorage as 353 
example for a polar region airport (Latitude 61°N), Singapore for an equatorial airport (1°N) and Sydney as example 354 
for mid-latitude (33°S) compared to Braunschweig assuming a 3° GPA 355 
 356 
Anchorage is located at a northern latitude of 61°, Singapore is located very close to the equator at 1° North and 357 
Sydney is located at 33°S in the equatorial to mid-latitude region. Together with Braunschweig (at 52°N) those 358 
airports represent the typical range in which GBAS stations are expected to be located. The monitor thresholds 359 
tend to be the lowest in Singapore (green curve). The times when the monitoring threshold decreases below 1 m 360 
for the most critical satellite correspond to epochs when many satellites are visible (13 or 14). At these epochs it 361 
is possible to select subsets which create larger values for vertS than at times when there are fewer satellites 362 
available. Sydney shows a monitoring threshold very similar to that of Braunschweig. Only for one short period 363 
of about 20 minutes around 2 h 30 min it drops below a value of 1 m. During this time there are also 13 satellites 364 
visible while at most other epochs the number is mostly between 12 and 8. For Anchorage there are four spikes 365 
visible between 2 h and 4 h where the threshold becomes very large. At these epochs there are 11, 9, 7 and 10 366 
satellites visible while most of the time there are at least 10 satellites available, sometimes up to 14. In a similar 367 
way as could be observed at the other locations, a smaller number of available satellites generally increases the 368 
monitoring threshold. However, the effect is not as visible as in the other example sites because due the location 369 
far up north more satellite subsets are excluded in the geometry screening process.  370 
 371 
Discussion / Conclusion 372 
We showed a method to meet the monitoring requirements for an automatic landing system based on GBAS 373 
navigation from an airworthiness perspective. Instead of specific requirements concerning ionospheric gradients 374 
only, it targets the actual requirement of ensuring a safe landing in the touchdown box given the current actual 375 
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satellite constellation and approach geometry. The detection threshold can be increased compared to the draft 376 
SARPS by modifying some overly conservative assumptions and taking into account the actual satellite 377 
geometry. This method has the advantage of significantly relaxing the ground monitoring requirement for 378 
ionospheric disturbances. Furthermore, any errors which do not relate to receiver implementation and airframe 379 
characteristics of arriving aircraft can be detected by placing the monitoring receiver close to the touchdown 380 
point, irrespective of their source. This method makes the siting limit of 5 km irrelevant because it can limit 381 
potential differential ranging errors to a safe level, irrespective of the distance to the GBAS ground station. 382 
Reference receiver siting at airports is a very challenging task because of required obstacle clearance near 383 
runways and taxiways, as well as protection of the reference antennas against potential sources of multipath. The 384 
elimination or relaxation of the 5 km limit would simplify reference receiver siting significantly and make 385 
GBAS usable at more airports. At large capacity and environmentally constrained airports GBAS is expected to 386 
provide approach service on advanced and possibly curved trajectories and thus to contribute to reduce emissions 387 
and increase capacity. The monitoring receiver can furthermore check the validity and provide independent 388 
monitoring of the broadcast corrections and runway reference coordinates by means of its known position 389 
relative to the approach track.  390 
 391 
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